This paper presents the complete description of the best differentials and linear hulls in 2-round Kuznyechik. We proved that 2-round MEDP = 2 −86.66... , MELP = 2 −76.739... . A comparison is made with similar results for the AES cipher.
Introduction
This paper presents the results of the development of low-complexity algorithms, that will allow to find the complete description of the best differential trails, differentials, linear characteristics, linear hulls and exact values of maximum expected differential and linear probability (MEDP, MELP) for 2-round Kuznyechik.
We proved that 2-round MEDP = 2 −86.66... , MELP = 2 −76.739... . A comparison is made with similar cryptanalysis results for the AES cipher [1] .
The main focus will be on the differential method. The results of the search for linear characteristics will be obtained in a similar way, due to the existence well-known duality between differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis [2] .
Basic information
Kuznyechik block cipher [3] consists of a sequence of 9 rounds and a post-whitening key addition. Each round contains three operations:
X -modulo 2 addition of an input block with an iterative key; S -parallel application of a fixed bijective substitution to each byte of the block;
L -linear transformation which is defined as a LFSR over GF (2 8 ). It can be represented as multiplication by the matrix L over GF (2 8 ). The block size is 128 bits (n = 16 bytes). A 2-round differential trail can be represented as the following scheme: 
..., x n ) -the difference of input blocks in byte representation, ∆ 1 = (α 1 , ..., α n ) -the difference of blocks after the nonlinear transformation on the first round, ∆ 2 = (β 1 , ..., β n ) = (α 1 , ..., α n )L -the difference of blocks after the linear transformation (matrix multiplication in row-by-row representation), ∆y = (y 1 , ..., y n ) -the difference of blocks after the nonlinear transformation on the second round.
Note that due to linearity and invertibility the linear transformation on the second round can be omitted without loss of generality.
The nonlinear transformation of each S-box is characterized by a matrix of transition probabilities (Differential Distribution Table) . DDT is the set of local difference characteristics: P (α → β) = Pr(S(χ ⊕ α) ⊕ S(χ) = β), α, β, χ ∈ {0, 1} 8 ,
where χ is a uniformly distributed random variable. S-box with nonzero input difference α = 0 is called active. 2-round differential trail ∆x → ∆ 1 → ∆ 2 → ∆y is a random variable, that has a probability (EDCP [1] )
The best differential trail has probability P trail best = P best (∆x → ∆ 1 → ∆ 2 → ∆y) = = max (∆x,∆ 1 ,∆ 2 ,∆y)\(0,0,0,0)
Differential is the set of all differential trails that have the same ∆x and ∆y.
Differential is characterized by the probability (EDP [1] )
where T is the number of the differential trails in the differential. The best differential has probability (MEDP [1] ):
P dif f best = P best (∆x → ∆y) = max (∆x,∆y)\(0,0)
P (∆x → ∆y)
Our first goal is to find the most probable differential trail -the best differential trail.
Matrix L is part of the matrix G = E|L. G is the generator matrix of the MDS-code (32, 16, 17) over GF (2 8 ). Thus, the minimum possible total weight of vectors ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 is equal to the minimum code distance d = 17. We will start searching for the most probable differential trail by finding all minimum byte weight codewords in G.
3 Algorithm for finding codewords with the smallest byte weight
Let (t, r) such, that t + r = n +1, t > 0, r > 0. Fix k 1 , . . . , k t , m 1 , . . . , m r -locations of non-zero elements in the vectors ∆ 1 = (α 1 , ..., α n ) and ∆ 2 = (β 1 , ..., β n ) accordingly. Let's present the transformation ∆ 1 L = ∆ 2 as a system of equations. Select the subsystem S n−r,t in the system
). Solve the subsystem S n−r,t . The set of solutions is (α 
Let's denote these sets of solutions
The union of such sets is the set
of all code vectors of minimum weight n + 1. The cardinality of the set M (n+1) is equal to 255 · (t,r):t+r=n+1
n+1 . Note, that the same expression for the number of codewords of minimal weight is obtained in [5] .
Pseudocode of the algorithm is presented in Appendix E.
Algorithm for finding the best differential trail
In general, we consider differential trails for 2 rounds
We start with differential trails containing the minimum number of active S-boxes (minimal weight of ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 ).
To simplify the notation we
Coordinates equal to zero are omitted in notation.
is the maximum probability of differential trail with a fixed vector (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ). Then the most probable differential trail ∆x → ∆ 1 → ∆ 2 → ∆y has the probability: P trail best = max
Let the vector (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) has a weight n + 1:
Two sets of differential trails were found in M (n+1) . Each trail in both sets has a maximum probability: The trails in the set have the same inner part (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ). There are no other trails that would have a maximum probability. The found differential trails are presented in Appendix A.
Then the weight (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) is equal to n + 1 = 17.
Proof. One can see that the estimate
is true for any differential trail ∆x
In the case of Kuznyechik, max
. Then for any w ≥ 18 it holds that: 
Algorithm for finding the best differential
Suppose that the best differential will also be achieved on a configuration containing the minimum number w = n + 1 = 17 of active S-boxes.
Each subset M (n+1) (k 1 , . . . , k t , m 1 , . . . , m r ) contains exactly 255 code vectors. The sets k 1 , . . . , k t and m 1 , . . . , m r specify the positions of active Sboxes. Hence the differential ∆x → ∆y contains trails from only one subset
Consider an algorithm that allows you to get rid of the exhaustive search. It is based on the pruning of the branches of the search tree by using the constructed upper bounds.
In the previous paragraph, the exact value of the best differential trail is given P trail best = 2 −86.66... . This probability is the lower bound for the probability of the best differential. It is always possible to construct a differential, consisting of one best trail P dif f best ≥ P trail best . We will use the probability P dif f est = P trail best as a threshold value.
Algorithm for calculating the upper bound of the differential
Let a subset of codewords (4) is given. Calculate the upper bound of the differential.
Fix u ≤ t, v ≤ r. Select t − u coordinates α and r − v coordinates β in the equation (4):
For all i = 1, 255 we obtain an easily computable upper bound for the part of the differential trail
Let's order these estimates in descending order. We will construct for each x (and y) the sequence of transition probabilities. Let's use the S-box transition probability matrix (DDT):
Consider the differential (3). Let the summands be ordered in descending order. Then
(9) If the resulting upper bound (9) is less than the threshold P dif f est , then the subset is no longer considered.
In practice, the values u and v are selected experimentally depending on the cipher substitution. For Kuznyechik u = v = 2 are close to optimal parameters. For such values, approximately 9 10 subsets are excluded from being considered.
Algorithm for constructing the differential
Suppose that for some subset M (n+1) (k 1 , . . . , k t , m 1 , . . . , m r ) the estimate is greater than the threshold value P dif f est . Then the following estimate also holds
We will sequentially search through possible non-zero values x k 1 , . . . , x k t and y m 1 , . . . , y m r . The maximum values max
. We will also use the pruning of the branches of the search tree.
Denote
In the estimate (10), we fix the first factor with the number k 1 (the place of the first nonzero element). Let x k 1 = 1. Then we replace max
). After that we have the estimate P (a 1 = 1). If the estimate P (a 1 = 1) is less than the threshold value P dif f est , then we perform a search among the elements x k 1 = 2, 3, ...255. We will search until the element
Let such x k 1 = a 1 is found. We perform similarly search of the second factor. Consider the bytes x k 2 = 1, 2, . . . , a 2 , . . . , 255. Substituting P (a 2 → α
) into the estimate P (a 1 ). Do this until a 2 :
est is found. If such an element is not found then return to the previous step and try to accomplish this algorithm for the remaining bytes
We continue the recursive search. We replace the s+1 -th factor in
If the algorithm substituted all the elements a 1 , . . . , a t , b 1 , . . . , b r and did not reject the subset of codewords, then we obtained an exact estimate P (a 1 , . . . , a t → b 1 , . . . , b r ) and the differential
(11) In this case, the value P dif f est is updated. We return to the previous step of the algorithm and continue the search in the subset
The last step of the algorithm:
est . It was shown that if the number of active substitutions is n + 1 = 17, then each best differential contains only one differential trail.
The best differential trails are presented in Appendix A. Pseudocodes of algorithms are presented in Appendix E.
Lemma 2. Let ∆x → ∆y is the differential in 2-round Kuznyechik. Let P (∆x → ∆y) be maximal among all differentials. Then the number of active S-boxes in ∆x → ∆y is equal to n + 1 = 17.
The main idea of the proof is to construct an upper bound for the differential ∆x → ∆y containing n + 2 = d + 1 = 18 active S-boxes. The upper estimate is built by using: two majorants (8); the MDS code property (byte weight of the sum of codewords is not less than n + 1); the rearrangement inequality [6] . The proof of the Lemma is presented in Appendix D.
The comparison with AES
The comparison of the results given in this paper for Kuznyechik with the results of the AES cipher analysis is of particular interest [1] .
Note the following differences between 2-round versions of the ciphers [3, 4] .
Kuznyechik -one MDS-matrix 16 × 16; pseudorandom, non-analytical S-box; DDT and LAT do not have obvious patterns.
AES -byte permutation layer and four MDS-matrix 4 × 4; all nontrivial rows and columns in DDT (and LAT) have the same distribution of values.
Differences in linear and non-linear transformations lead to different approaches for calculating differential and linear characteristics.
In the case of AES the actual work is reduced to a single MDS-matrix 4 × 4. This allows you to construct the entire set of codewords. In the case of Kuznyechik, due to the use of the algorithm (3), only low-weight codewords are iterated over. After that, it is analytically shown that the differential on codewords of greater weight will be worse than the constructed one.
The best differential in AES consists of 75 differential trails. The estimate (6) is used in the construction of the differential. The estimate (10) will be the same for any subset of code words and is therefore not used. MEDP = 2 −28.272... , MELP = 2 −27.287... . The best differential in Kuznyechik consists of a single differential trail, but the best linear hull consists of 37 linear characteristics. Due to the algorithm 5.1 it is shown that for the majority of considered subsets of codewords the best differential on them is not achieved. For the remaining subsets, an attempt is made to construct the best differential (algorithm 5.2). This is due to a sequence of transitions from the estimate (10) to the exact value (11). We got: MEDP = 2 −86.66... , MELP = 2 −76.739... .
Conclusion
The article presented: the algorithm for finding codewords with the small byte weight; algorithms for finding the complete description of the best differential trails (linear characteristics), differentials (linear hulls) in 2-round Kuznyechik.
The best differentials (linear hulls) and their probabilities were found. It was shown that the best differential contains one differential trail; the best linear hull contains 37 linear characteristics (Appendix A and B). We proved that 2-round MEDP = 2 −86.66... , MELP = 2 −76.739... . The estimate (5) for a differential trail (linear characteristic) is not achieved for 2-round Kuznyechik.
For any LSX cipher, the N -round MEDP (MELP) is the upper bound for (N + 1)-round MEDP (MELP). Therefore, the 2-round MEDP (MELP) of Kuznyechik is the upper bound for any larger number of rounds. Obtaining a more precise upper bounds is the subject of further research. 
B Application to Linear Cryptanalysis
There is a certain duality between differential and linear cryptanalysis [2] . It allows us to apply the algorithms described above to calculate linear characteristics.
We make the appropriate substitutions. Differential probability (1) , are replaced by linear probability. DDT is replaced by Linear Approximation Table (LAT) . Input/output differences α and β are replaced by input/output masks α and β correspondingly.
where • is the inner product over {0, 1}. By analogy with the differential trail a linear characteristic for 2 rounds is introduced:
Its probability (by analogy with (2)) is equal to
where [j] is j-th coordinate of the corresponding vector. The linear hull (similar to differential) is the set of all linear characteristics having input mask a and output mask b.
The probability of the linear hull (a → b) is equal to:
where T is the number of linear characteristics. You need to replace all formulas in the sections 4 and 5 according to the above analogies.
The maximum probability of the local linear characteristic of Kuznyechik is
The trivial estimate of the two-round linear characteristic is
The following results are obtained by executing the algorithms. The best linear characteristic has a probability equal to 00 28 00 28 28 00 00 26 00 28 00 00 00 24 00 00 256 · √ P (a→µ 1 ) 2 00 6a 00 97 55 00 00 06 00 2f 00 00 00 9a 00 00 µ 1 9f 23 45 ba 5a b8 00 00 00 00 41 00 4c 87 87 0d µ 2 24 24 26 26 28 28 00 00 00 00 28 00 28 28 28 26 256 · √ P (µ 2 →b) 2 Table 3 : Optimal internal part(µ 1 → µ 2 ).
The optimal inner part (µ 1 → µ 2 ) generates the best linear hull. 00 41 00 de 48 00 00 c6 00 5a 00 00 00 9f 00 00 a 9a 38 e8 a2 2f 69 00 00 00 00 6a 00 a7 ab ab 4b b The best linear hull (a, b) consist of 37 linear characteristics a → µ
2 → b, which are listed below (Table 5 and 6).
i µ 
C Codewords with minimum binary weight
Let G = E|L is a linear binary code, codeword length -256 bits, infoword length -128 bits.
L is 128 × 128 binary matrix, which defines the linear transformation of Kuznyechik.
It is shown (algorithm of the section (3)) that in a linear binary code G there are no codewords of binary weight 17, 18, 19, 20.
Two codewords with binary weight equal to 29 are found. Lemma 2. Let ∆x → ∆y is the differential in 2-round Kuznyechik. Let P (∆x → ∆y) is maximal among all differentials. Then the number of active S-boxes in ∆x → ∆y is equal to n + 1 = 17.
the best differential with A active S-boxes. It is shown that among differentials containing trails of weight n+1 = 17, the best probability is 
We will show that
Consider an arbitrary differential ∆x → ∆y with 18 active S-boxes. The differential consists of trails of the form ∆x → ∆ 1 → ∆ 2 → ∆y. The difference ∆x and all the ∆ 1 differences have the same set of active S-boxes. (k 1 , . . . , k t ) is the set of their positions. Similarly for ∆y and ∆ 2 , let's denote the positions of active S-boxes (m 1 , . . . , m r ), t + r = 18.
Using the algorithm (3), you can find all pairs (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ) corresponding to this set of active S-boxes. All differential trails ∆x → . . . → ∆y can only pass through these pairs. During the algorithm execution the system of equations with 18 − n = 2 free variables will be solved. The number of solutions, and accordingly the number of pairs (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 ), will not exceed 255 18−n = 255 2 . Let's present the set of pairs found as a table D. 
2 , and each column corresponds to the active S-box.
By definition, the probability of a differential with 18 active S-boxes is:
Let the ∆x and ∆y are fixed. Then each element of the table can be matched with the probability P (x k j → α
m j → y m j )). Let us denote this probability P i,j , then the probability of the differential is:
We give an upper bound of the (12 
You can see that Y is always greater than X. To get the highest estimate we consider the case when 2 columns of the table are estimated using X (and 16 columns -Y ).
The number of nonzero elements in the majorant X is v = 114. This allows us to refine the maximum number of differential trails in the differential T ≤ v 2 = 12996. And also refine the values of majorants: 
We divide the columns of the table into two groups:
We multiply the elements of the group I in pairs:
Arrange in each row of II all factors in non-increasing order.
Arrange the elements of each sequence P
T , P 1,j , . . . , P T,j , ∀j = 3, 18 (columns in D) in a non-increasing order. Denote the elements of the resulting sequencesP
T ,P 1,j , . . . ,P T,j , ∀j = 3, 18. From the rearrangement inequality [6] it follows that
Let's estimateP
T using X (13). Knowing that all pairs in the first and second columns are different, we replace the elements of the sequence by the X × X: 
Let's estimate the group II. We note that the following inequality holds:
Assume that the coordinates of all elements p 8 in II are known ( Fig.2.a) . We describe the procedure for reordering all elements p 6 , p 4 and p 2 in II. 1) Select the element in the first rowP 1,z = p 8 , z = 3, 18. Let z be the smallest (left column). If in the first row all elements are equal to p 8 , we consider the second row, etc.
2) Find the maximum of all elements in II, which have not been reordered before:P i ,j = max i,jP i,j ,P i,j = p 8 , i, i = 1, T , j, j = 3, 18. T , the coordinates of the elements p 8 and the value of the element with coordinates (1, z) do not change.
The element with coordinates (1, z) has been reordered. We choose in the first row the next element not equal to p 8 . We will perform the above steps 1 -4.
Perform steps 1 -4 sequentially for each element of the table not equal to p 8 and which has not been reordered before.
The result of the procedure will be the Thus it is proved that for a given arrangement of all elements p 8 , the reordering procedure allows us to obtain the greatest estimate (18).
Let us now consider the possible arrangement of elements p 8 in the group II.
The numbers of the elements p 8 in the tables D and D are the same. The number of rows containing the same number of elements p 8 also coincides.
Let w i be the number of elements p 8 in the i-th row of the table D,
16 -the number of columns in the group II, 2 -the number of elements p 8 in (16). Hence,
The number of rows containing exactly 2 elements p 8 can be estimated as a 16 2 · 2 2 -the number of pairs multiplied by the number of variants in the pair. Assume that the number of such pairs is greater. There are two different rows (two different codewords) that contain the same pair of bytes. Therefore, the sum of such codewords will give a codeword with a weight of 16 or less. It contradicts the MDS-code definition.
Let us estimate the number of rows with a greater number of elements. The maximum number of pairs is known - 
And also:
In addition, there should be a limit for the total number of pairs of ele-ments p 8 in the table D:
It is possible to show that the number of rows containing exactly ω = 8 elements p 8 , no more than ρ ≤ 5. In each column of the table D, no more than two different byte values correspond to the value of p 8 . Any row must have at most one intersection (the same byte in the same column) with any other row. Initially, the number of bytes that were not selected is equal to ν = 2 · 16 = 32.
Choose the first row that contains exactly 8 elements p 8 . Subtract ω = 8 from ν.
Choose the second row that intersects the first row. Subtract ω − 1 = 7 from ν.
Select the third row that intersects the first row and the second row. The minimum number that can be subtracted from ν is ω − 2 = 6.
And so on:
Hence, ρ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. If ρ = 6 then (26) less than zero. Similarly, when ω = 9 that ρ ≤ 4. I.e. it is possible to show that the number of rows containing exactly 9 elements p 8 , no more than 4. If ω = 10 or ω = 11 then ρ ≤ 3. If ω ∈ {12, 13, 14, 15, 16} then ρ ≤ 2.
Also, the following inequalities are true:
{i :
Let w i > 2 · 16 − w 1 − (w 2 − 1) + 2. Then the i-th row must have at least two identical bytes with the first row or second row. It contradicts the MDS-code definition. Let's iterate all possible sets w i , i = 1, T . We will take into account the restrictions (21), (23), (25), (27), (28).
We choose the maximum estimate among all sets w i , i = 1, T . 
Note that it is possible to obtain more rough estimate without any additional search. We will not use restrictions (21), (25). Take the maximum values of the inequalities (24) and (27). The inequality (27) shows that the greatest w 1 , . . . , w 5 = (16, 16, 11, 9, 8). Upper bounds in the inequality (24): exactly 7 elements p 8 -17 rows, 6 elements -10 rows, 5 elements -16 rows, 4 elements -32 rows, 3 elements -80 rows, 2 elements -320 rows, 1 element -3168 rows. 
The best estimate for a differential with 19 active S-boxes (P dif f 19 best
) cannot be greater than the best estimate for a differential with 18 active S-boxes (P dif f 18 best ).
Similarly for cases of 20, . . . , 32 active S-boxes. Hence, the original lemma is proved: 
E Pseudocode of algorithms
Algorithm for finding codewords with the smallest byte weight for j := 1 to t do 6: codewords.add((α, β)) 20: end for 21: return codewords
The above algorithm could be easily generalized to finding small weight w > n + 1 codewords. In this case, the number of free variables in each subsystem S n−r,t increases. Accordingly, the number of codewords generated by a single subsystem increases to 255 w−n . These codewords can include words that weigh less than w. This requires additional verification and increases the complexity of the algorithm.
The algorithm can be applied to an arbitrary MDS-code (2n, n, n + 1) over any finite field F.
We estimate the time complexity of the algorithm: Gaussian algorithm -
One of the applications of this algorithm is the search in MDS-code codewords with small binary weight. The results are presented in Appendix B.
Algorithm for finding the best differential trail 
Time complexity of the algorithm 5 is O(ord(F) 2 ). The complexity of the algorithm 6 is determined by the complexity of algorithm 7.
Algorithm for constructing the differential
Denote the complexity of the algorithm for constructing the differential as C dif f . In general case, algorithm 7 performs an exhaustive search of all inputs ∆x and outputs ∆y. In this case C dif f = O(ord(F) n ). But in our practice, the average number of operations performed by the algorithm for constructing the differential is approximately equal to ord(F) 2 . A more accurate estimate of the complexity is the subject of further research. 
